

# Intent Machines (in 15 min)

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Inaugural Intents Day!**

# Goals of an intent formalism

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1. Capture commonalities of intent systems
2. Capture structure, not implementation detail
3. Aid in analysis of:
  - a. Similarities and differences
  - b. Conditions for and behavior of composition
  - c. Relationship to other concepts (e.g. MEV)

# Candidate formalism

# Candidate: “Intent machine”

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1. Fix a state type **T**.
2. An *intent* is a function of type **T -> T -> 0 | 1**.
3. An *intent machine* is a potentially non-deterministic function of type **(T, Set I) -> (T, Set I)**
  - a. First tuple: prior state and candidate intents
  - b. Second tuple: posterior state and processed intents
4. Key property: *intent adherence*
  - a. **forall i in processed . i prior posterior = 1**

# Intent machines: decomposition

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Without loss of generality, this function can be decomposed into two steps:

1. *Enumeration*: computing a set of (candidate state, processed) tuples which satisfy intent adherence.
2. *Selection*: choosing one of the tuples to return.

# Intent machines: constraints

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This function may additionally constrain which state transitions are considered to be valid. This can be modelled as a “system intent” which must always be satisfied.

Examples:

- Interior EVM state transition function satisfied
- Resource linearity & logics satisfied

# Intent machines: selection

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Selection picks one pair from the set of valid options.

**choose :: Set (T, Set I) -> (T, Set I)**

All of the interesting structure lies here.

# Selection functions



# Example selection functions I

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→ “Pure chaos”

- ◆ Select a valid return pair at random

→ “Pareto-efficient chaos”

- ◆ Select the return pair which satisfies the most intents; break ties with randomness.

→ “Utility maximization”

- ◆ Select the return pair which maximizes some scalar function  $\mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbf{Nat}$ .

# Example selection functions II

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## → “Profit maximization”

- ◆ Utility maximization with a utility function that calculates the balance of some specific token owned by the operator’s address.

## → “Welfare maximization”

- ◆ Utility maximization with a utility function set to the welfare function of some community.

## → “Expected utility maximization”

- ◆ Select the return pair which maximizes expected future utility, given some probability distribution over future intents conditional on the posterior state.

# Composition: selection functions

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## → “Optimistic preferred”

- ◆ If both selection functions agree, return that, else use the solution chosen by one of them.

## → “Optimistic random”

- ◆ If both selection functions agree, return that, else choose randomly between options the Pareto frontier.

## → “Weighted welfare”

- ◆ (works for scalar utility functions only)
- ◆ Select according to some weighted sum.

# Distribution

# Analysis: distribution

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- Anoma (& many others) effectively implement a distributed intent machine
  - ◆ Different parties performing enumeration and selection.
  - ◆ Consensus to agree on which new state will be chosen.
- Everything is distributed!
  - ◆ State
  - ◆ Computation
  - ◆ Enumeration
  - ◆ Selection
  - ◆ Verification

# Analysis: composition under distribution

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- This distributed intent machine is composed of ... other intent machines (with different select functions)
  - ◆ e.g. profit-maximizing operators
- One could understand cryptoeconomic mechanism design as trying to set incentives to provide a particular composed selection function.
- MEV & co. enter here
- (needs more work)

# Survey questions

# Questions for the audience

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1. What would your goals for an intent formalism be?
2. Do you think this option makes sense?
  - a. Which parts are clear / unclear?
3. Are there other compelling candidate formalisms?

Thanks!